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HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-INTERVENTION 
IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM* 
Jose A. Cabranes** 
T HE promotion and protection of human rights is a recent and 
significant innovation in the inter-American system. For more 
than a decade after its founding, the Organization of American 
States (OAS) exhibited no particular inclination to undertake a pro-
gram to provide international protection for fundamental freedoms 
within member states. The proclamation in 1948 of the highly-
vaunted American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man1 
and the frequent invocation of "human rights," "universal moral-
ity," and "the rights of man" in resolutions and international instru-
ments produced by the regional organization of the American re-
publics amounted to little more than well-intentioned, but quite 
fanciful, rhetoric. 
The long silence of the inter-American system is remarkable 
when contrasted with the continuing efforts of the United Nations 
to elaborate an International Bill of Rights and the significant ac-
complishments of the Council of Europe in implementing on a re-
gional basis the principal values enunciated in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. The OAS' lack of interest, until quite 
recently, in undertaking a similar international program to protect 
human rights in the American republics is a function of several 
very special factors, the most important of which is the traditional 
Latin American repudiation of intervention, in whatever form and 
for whatever reason, in the internal affairs of American states. This 
article will examine the recent efforts to protect such rights in the 
American continent within the context of the evolution of the inter-
American system and the development within that system of the 
law of non-intervention. 
I. NoN-INTERVENTION AND "AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LAw" 
The concept of what Judge Alejandro Alvarez styled "American 
international law" was not of Latin American origin. Nor was it 
• An abstract of this article was presented at a Colloquium on Regional Inter-
national Organizations sponsored by the British Institute of International and Com-
parative Law at Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire, England, July 1-3, 1966.-Ed. 
• • Kellett Research Fellow, Columbia University; lately Humanitarian Trust Stu-
dent in Public International Law, University of Cambridge. A.B. 1961, Columbia 
University; LL.B. 1965, Yale University.-Ed. 
I. Resolution XXX, Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, 
Colombia, March 30-May 2, 1948, Final Act (Pan-American Union 1948), p. 38. For 
a convenient text, see 43 AM, J. !NT'L L, 133 (Supp. 1949). 
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intended by its Latin American proponents to be applied exclusively 
by the Latin American states in their relations with one another. 
Although much of the impetus for the development of a regional 
international law came from Latin American statesmen and jurists, 
and a considerable part of its appeal is attributable to the common 
Hispanic cultural heritage of the nations of Latin America, the idea 
of a regional system of public order has its source in President Mon-
roe's historic pronouncement of 1823.2 The American international 
law expounded by Alvarez, Drago, and the disciples of Calvo devel-
oped as a response to the interventionist claims of European creditor 
states in the latter part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries, and subsequently as a reaction to the United 
States' own version of "American public law." The principal object 
of the regional international law propounded by Latin American 
jurists was the negation of the European claims and the replacement 
of the unilateral North American concept of a regional system of 
public order with one that reflected the interests of all of the Amer-
ican republics. 
Because of its predominant economic and military position, the 
United States had come to regard the New World as its historic 
sphere of influence and had based its conceptions of national secur-
ity upon the detachment of the hemisphere from the political affairs 
of the rest of the world. The Monroe Doctrine, stated as a putative 
principle of public international law, evolved to express the policy 
goals of the nation that had fathered it. Until the last decades of 
the nineteenth century and the resurgence of Manifest Destiny, re-
sort by the United States to the Monroe Doctrine had, with varying 
degrees of success, been limited to protesting or forestalling new ac-
quisitions of territory in the American hemisphere by extra-con-
tinental powers. In 1895, however, the United States invoked the 
Doctrine in its efforts to have the Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dis-
pute settled amicably. The note of the Department of State to the 
British Government, which affirmed that the United States would 
2. For the text of the pertinent extracts of President Monroe's annual message to 
Congress, see 6 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 (1906). The most compre• 
hensive studies of the origins and development of the Monroe Doctrine are the series 
of volumes by Professor Dexter Perkins: HANDS OFF: A HISTORY OF THE MONROE 
DOCTRINE (1941); THE MONROE DOCTRINE, 1867-1907 (1937); THE MONROE DOCTRINE, 
1826-1867 (1933); THE MoNROE DOCTRINE, 1823-1826 (1932). A good documentary 
history of the Doctrine, including a useful collection of the views of North American 
and Latin American jurists and statesmen is provided in Judge (then Professor) 
Alvarez's work in commemoration of the centennary of President Monroe's pronounce• 
ment. ALVAREZ, THE MONROE DOCTRINE: ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LIFE 
OF THE STATES OF THE NEW WORLD (1924). 
April 1967] Human Rights b Non-Intervention 1149 
regard as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine any pressure brought 
on Venezuela to yield to British territorial demands, could hardly 
have been fully satisfactory to Latin American statesmen, some of 
whom had hoped that the Doctrine merely meant that the United 
States would insulate the Western Hemisphere from territorial 
claims by European powers. For, in asserting "a doctrine of Amer-
ican public law ... long and firmly established and supported, ... " 
Secretary of State Richard Olney offered a new and portentous 
rationale: 
To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, 
and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposi-
tion. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or goodwill felt 
for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized 
state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable 
characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in 
addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its 
isolated position render it master of the situation and practically in-
vulnerable as against any or all other powers.3 
During the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, the United 
States used the Monroe Doctrine to claim competence to exercise 
"an international police power" in the New World. Rather than 
risk European armed intervention to enforce the debt obligations 
3. 6 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 553. In a July 14, 1870, communication 
from Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to President Grant the Doctrine was described 
as "a principle of government for this continent and its adjacent islands .... " Id. 
at 430. In response to Secretary Olney's pronouncements on the Monroe Doctrine, 
which he described as "Mr. Olney's doctrines," the British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Salisbury, rejected the claim that the Doctrine or its recent invocations were a part of, 
or sanctioned by, international law: 
[I]nternational law is founded on the general consent of nations; and no statesman, 
however eminent, and no nation, however powerful, are competent to insert into 
the code of international law a novel principle which was never recognized 
before, and which has not since been accepted by the Government of any other 
country. The United States have a right, like any other nation, to interpose in 
any controversy by which their own interests are affected; and they are the judge 
whether those interests are touched, and in what measure they should be sus• 
tained. But their rights are in no way strengthened or extended by the fact that 
the controversy affects some territory which is called American .••• Mr. Olney's 
principle that "American questions are for American decision," ... can not be 
sustained by any reasoning drawn from the law of nations. 
Lord Salisbury to Sir Julian Pauncefote, the .British Minister to the United States, 
Nov. 26, 1895, in id. at 563. Less than a month after the transmission of Lord 
Salisbury's response, a forceful rejoinder on the question of the Doctrine's place in 
international law was provided by President Cleveland in a special message to Congress 
on the Venezuelan affair, December 17, 1895: 
Practically the principle for which we contend has peculiar if not exclusive 
relation to the United States. It may not have been admitted in so many words 
to the code of international law, but since in international councils every nation 
is entitled to the rights belonging to it, if the enforcement of the Monroe Doc-
trine is something we may justly claim it has its place in the code of international 
law as certainly and as securely as if it were specifically mentioned .•.• 
Id. at 577. 
1150 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:1147 
of Latin American states, the United States asserted, in the so-called 
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the right to intervene 
in the affairs of Latin American states in order to prevent inter-
vention by extra-continental powers.4 Naturally enough, Monroismo 
came to be regarded in Latin America as synonymous with the Roose-
velt policy of "the big stick" and with the unilateral claim to the 
right to intervene in the internal affairs of states that failed to con-
form to the United States' conception of "reasonable efficiency and 
decency in social and political matters." 
The Roosevelt Corollary-and, for that matter, the Olney Pro-
nouncement of 1895 and much of the Latin American policy of the 
United States until the administration of Franklin Roosevelt-was 
significant not simply for its implicit denial of the principle of equal-
ity of states that underlies the very concept of international law. Of 
equal importance was the unabashed proclamation, which invariably 
accompanied the applications of this new version of the Monroe 
Doctrine, of the superiority of United States political and social in-
stitutions and the express denial of confidence in both the standards 
and the machinery of justice of the Latin American states. Indeed, 
this lack of respect for the political independence and sovereignty 
of the Latin American states in "flagrant cases of wrongdoing or im-
potence" was a faithful expression of the dominant North Amer-
ican conception of American regional law. 
It is no coincidence that, while the law asserted by the United 
States to govern the international relations of states in the Western 
Hemisphere reflected confidence in her ovm institutions and stand-
ards of justice and suspicion of those of its southern neighbors, the 
law propounded by Latin American publicists revealed an over-
whelming concern for the unlimited independence and territorial 
integrity of the American states as well as respect for local standards 
of justice. The "American international law" promoted by Latin 
American writers and statesmen may indeed have found an appeal-
ing rationale in "the spirit of American fraternity," as Alvarez sug-
4. Roosevelt's doctrine of "protective intervention" was asserted in his annual 
message to Congress in 1904: 
Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty 
friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency 
and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obliga-
tions, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, 
or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, 
may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized 
nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to 
the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant 
cases of wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. 
6 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 596-97; also quoted in THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LATIN 
AMERICAN PoucY: A DOCUMENTARY REcoRD 361-62 (Gantenbein ed. 1950). 
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gested,5 but the traditional rhetoric of Pan Americanism was not 
its principal source. The interest of Latin Americans in an Amer-
ican international law was aroused not by "continental solidarity"6 
or l' esprit international americain, 7 but rather by a common fear of 
North American expansionism and a common concern for Latin 
American political independence. The work of jurists such as Al-
varez in elucidating the concept of regional international law, the 
affirmation and ultimate acceptance of the Drago Doctrine, the per-
sistent assertion of the doctrine that bears the name of Carlos Calvo, 
and the slow start and unique form of the human rights program of 
the OAS can be understood only against the background of the 
United States' historic claim to a special competence in shaping the 
public order of the Americas and the response to this claim by the 
Latin American states. 
From the time that the Latin American states obtained their 
independence from Spain and Portugal, they have been acutely 
concerned with the fundamental problem of national existence: how 
to maintain the respect of other, more powerful states for their 
political independence and territorial integrity. The Latin American 
states are, as Professor S. E. Finer has recently observed, "the oldest 
of the 'new states.' "8 Not unlike the emergent states of Africa and 
Asia in the 1950's and 1960's, the Latin American republics were 
poor, weak, and fearful of the intentions of larger powers. Turning 
to international law for the protection of their vital interests, they 
nonetheless rejected or sought to modify those principles of law 
which they had played no role in forming and which now seemed 
to serve only the interests of the large powers. 
In their own self-interest, Latin American jurists readily accepted 
the "two worlds" idea that lay at the heart of the Monroe Doctrine 
and the Roosevelt Corollary; they also agreed that the separation of 
the Old World and the New World required the elaboration of an 
international law responsive to this separate development. In addi-
tion, they were receptive to the principle of non-intervention by 
extra-continental powers in the internal affairs of states in the West-
ern Hemisphere. But they could not have been expected to accept, 
and they did not accept, the United States' claim that it could exercise 
an international police power, even where that power was ostensibly 
5. Alvarez, Latin America and International Law, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 294 (1909). 
6. Id. at 336-37. 
7. Asylum Case, (1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266, 294 (Alvarez, J., dissenting). 
8. Finer, The Argentine Trouble: Between Sword and State, in Encounter, Sept. 
1965, pp. 59, 66. · 
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designed merely to forestall intervention by European states.9 What 
Latin American proponents of an American international law 
sought, therefore, was a body of law that expressed their common 
abhorrence both of intervention in their internal affairs and of threats 
to their political independence. 
While realizing the very practical benefits that they might derive 
from an American international law, Latin American statesmen and 
jurists rejected the contention that the United States was, or could 
be, the sole source of that law. A true public order of the Americas, 
they argued, must rest on the recognition of the juridical equality of 
states: each American state must have an equal voice in formulating 
that order. Although not unaware of the resulting numerical advan-
tage that the Latin American states would thereby enjoy in matters 
of common interest, Latin American publicists fully realized that no 
legal regime for the relations of the American states could possibly 
serve their purposes without the ratification and cooperation of the 
wealthiest and most powerful of their number. So it was that in the 
very years in which the United States was asserting a strongly inter-
ventionist doctrine as the settled law of the New World, the conver-
gence of Latin American legal philosophy and diplomatic practice 
took place. As Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis has observed: "Latin 
American jurisprudence strained toward the Doctrine of Non-
Intervention under whatever circumstances, toward the absolute 
and unhampered sovereignty of the state, even toward its complete 
irresponsibility to foreign governments."10 He continued: 
It was the supreme diplomatic objective of the twenty Latiri Ameri-
can republics to write this into a code of "American international 
law," and to get the United States to ratify it. That would bind the 
United States against further interventions, even of a protective 
9. Professor Bemis, who believes that "[the] Manifest Destiny of imperialism ••• 
was not the true spirit of American nationality, nor altogether a permanent feature 
in the history of the Republic," prefers to call this claim to an international police 
power "protective imperialism.'' "The New Manifest Destiny, the Cuban question and 
the war with Spain had ushered in • . • an era of protective imperalism focused on 
the defense of an Isthmian canal in a passageway between the two seacoasts of the 
Continental Republic vital to its naval communications and to its security." BEMIS, 
THE LATIN AMERICAN Pouey OF nm UNITED STATES 140 (1943). It may be observed 
that few other North American authorities on the United States' Latin American 
policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century have been as unabashedly 
sympathetic in their assessment of the United States' policy goals and the means 
chosen to implement them. There is perhaps something revealing about the fact, 
noted by Professor Charles G. Fenwick, that North American writers have tended to 
treat the Monroe Doctrine under the heading of self-defense, while Hispanic American 
publicists have customarily dealt with the same subject matter under the heading of 
non-intervention. Fenwick, Intervention: Individual and Collective, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 
645, 649 (1945). 
10. BEMIS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 237. 
April 1967) Human Rights b Non-Intervention 1153 
nature, to prevent European intervention. It would not only secure 
a renunciation of the right of intervention as commonly understood 
by the law of nations in the global or universal sense; it also would 
line the United States up against the right of intervention in the 
New World by a non-American state, even to protect its subjects 
against denial of justice.11 
Although efforts to codify international law ordinarily engage 
only the interest of specialists, one notable exception was the Latin 
American movement for the codification of public international 
law in the Western Hemisphere, a movement that has exercised a 
profound and prolonged influence on the life of the American con-
tinent and which constitutes a unique chapter in the history of 
international relations. The success of this movement constituted the 
major political triumph of the Latin American states in the second 
quarter of the twentieth century. In a series of historic conferences 
in the 1930's, the American republics codified the United States' 
renunciation of its claim to be competent to exercise an international 
police power in the Western Hemisphere and its acceptance of the 
doctrine of absolute non-intervention.12 At the Inter-American Con-
11. Id. at 237-38. 
12. The Drago Doctrine-that "the public debt [of an American state] cannot 
occasion armed intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of Amer-
ican nations by a European power"-was put forward as a corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina during the Venezuelan debt 
controversy with Great Britain, Germany, and Italy (1902). For the text of the Drago 
Doctrine, as embodied in Drago's instructions to the Argentine minister to the United 
States, see 1903 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES I, reprinted in 1 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 1 (Supp. 1907). For an illuminating interpretation of the significance of the 
Drago Doctrine in the context of the historical growth of the "Western Hemisphere 
Idea," see 'WHITAKER, THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDEA: ITS RISE AND DECLINE 86-107 
(1954). Subject to an obligation on the part of a debtor state to accept an offer of 
arbitration, the doctrine was accepted at the Second Hague Conference (1907). How-
ever, this condition proved unacceptable to a majority of Latin American states. These 
states were unwilling to accept any qualifications upon the prohibition of armed force, 
intervention, or the occupation of an American state. See BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC 
PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 308-25 (1915); SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 
1899 AND 1907, at 386-422 (1909); Drago, State Loans in Their Relation to International 
Policy, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 692 (1907). 
At the Havana Conference of 1928, the United States' opposition compelled the 
withdrawal of a draft treaty that enunciated the principle that no state had the 
right to intervene in the internal affairs of an American republic. But at the Seventh 
International Conference of American States, held in Montevideo in 1933, the United 
States joined the Latin American states in adherence to the Convention on Rights 
and Duties of States. Article 8 of the convention read as follows: "No state has the 
right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." This instrument 
marked the first occasion on which the United States had accepted the non-inter-
vention doctrine. Although the United States issued a reservation of its rights by 
"the law of nations as generally recognized," casting some small doubt on the extent 
of its commitment to the principle adopted at Montevideo, the breakthrough for the 
Latin Americans and the trend of North American policy was confirmed by the 
subsequent withdrawal of United States armed forces or other forms of direct political 
control from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba. Shortly before the inaugura-
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ference on Problems of War and Peace, held in Mexico City in early 
1945 to lay the groundwork for the post-war reorganization of the 
inter-American system, the American republics were able to declare 
that the principle of non-intervention proclaimed at the Montevideo 
Conference of 1933 and the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936 now 
constituted a part of the international law of the New World.18 
The success of the codification movement was in large part the 
result of the efforts of tenacious Latin American jurists such as 
Alvarez, and of sympathizers and allies in numerous North American 
organizations and foundations which were devoted to the cause of 
peace and the development of international law.14 Equally important 
to the success of the movement were the ebbing of imperialist senti-
ment in the United States and the growing conviction among North 
tion of President Franklin Roosevelt, the Hoover administtation had ordered the 
withdrawal of United States troops from Nicaragua CTanuary 1933). 
At the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held in 1936 in 
Buenos Aires, whatever doubts may have existed after 1933 about the meaning of 
the United States' reservation at Montevideo were wiped away by its acceptance of the 
Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention, which explicitly re-affirmed the doc-
trine set forth at Montevideo, and in its first article declared "inadmissible the in• 
tervention of any [High Contracting Party], directly or indirectly, and for whatever 
reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties." The doctrine 
of non-intervention was re-affirmed still again, and the Drago Doctrine's proscription 
of "forcible collection of pecuniary debts" was re-asserted, in the Declaration of 
Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation, promulgated at the Buenos 
Aires Conference. 
In the Declaration of American Principles issued by the Eighth International 
Conference of American States, held in Lim.a in 1988, the American republics re-
committed themselves to the principle that "the intervention of any State in the 
internal or external affairs of another is inadmissible." 
The Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Lima conferences codified what some authors 
have called the doctrine of absolute non-intervention. This statement of the doctrine is 
presumably intended to convey the unique formulation given to the principle of 
non-intervention in the international law of the Western Hemisphere-one which 
is explicitly and deliberately designed to prohibit the various forms of intervention 
permitted under universal customary international law. 
The texts of the pertinent documents of the Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Lima 
conferences are conveniently brought together in THE EVOLUTION OF OUll LA11N 
A11muCAN PouCY: A DOCUMENTARY REcoRD app. A (Gantenbein ed. 1950). 
13. See Preamble to the Act of Chapultepec arts. 5(B) &: (G), in 12 DEP'T STATE 
BULL. 339 (1945), reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 108 (Supp. 1945). 
14. Among the notable Latin American advocates of codification of "American 
international law" were Judge Alvarez and Judge Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante y 
Sirven. Another was Dr. Jose G. Guerrero, also a member of the World Court, The 
North Americans included Elihu Root, the Secretary of State in the administration 
of Theodore Roosevelt, a long-time president of the American Society of International 
Law and a leading proponent of United States commitment to international arbitral 
and judicial procedures. Another, and perhaps the most important of all, was Dr. 
James Brown Scott. A close friend and collaborator of Alvarez, and a former solicitor 
of the Department of State, Dr. Scott served for many years as secretary of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and president of the American Institute 
of International Law, an adjunct of the Endowment devoted to the promotion and 
codification of "American international law." He served for more than thirty years 
as an editor of the American Journal of International Law. 
April 1967] Human Rights & Non-Intervention 1155 
American intellectuals and statesmen that intervention had failed to 
cure the social and political ailments of the Latin American republics 
and had failed to accomplish the United States' basic policy objec-
tives. Although the United States remained committed to the political 
and strategic doctrine that the security of the Western Hemisphere 
and the security of the United States were indivisible, the rise of 
aggressive totalitarian regimes in Europe and Asia further empha-
sized the need for unity in the Americas. The "good neighbor" policy 
to which Franklin Roosevelt dedicated the United States in his 1933 
inaugural address recognized that the most effective means of achiev-
ing the hemispheric unity deemed essential to the United States' 
national security was to enlist the positive cooperation of the Latin 
American states in a common resistance to intervention by extra-
continental powers. Not surprisingly, therefore, the repudiation of 
the unilateral claim to the right of intervention and the acceptance of 
the doctrine of absolute non-intervention by the United States was 
directly related to the development (at the urging of the United 
States) of a system of mutual consultation on matters affecting the 
peace of the hemisphere. The system of consultation established in 
the late 1930's formed the basis of the mutual security system orga-
nized after the war to "panamericanize" or "multilateralize" the 
basic political and strategic tenets of the Monroe Doctrine. One 
eminent student of the American regional system of public order 
accurately assessed the inter-relationship of the codification of the 
doctrine of non-intervention and the development of the regional 
system of collective defense when he wrote: 
One of the most important factors, if not the most important factor 
in bringing about the change of policy on the part of the United 
States was doubtless the adoption, at the same Buenos Aires Confer-
ence, of the provisions for general "consultation."15 
To the apparent satisfaction of both the United States and the states 
of Latin America, the inter-American system as constituted after the 
Second World War rested on the twin pillars of non-intervention 
and hemispheric security. 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
In the years after World War II, as the American republics pro-
ceeded to organize a regional system of public order, the Latin 
American states continued to be as much concerned with the re-
15. Fenwick, supra note 9, at 656. For a concurring view, and an incisive examina-
tion of the relationship of the renunciation of intervention and the evolution of 
"collective intervention," see Falk, The Legitimacy of Legislative Intervention by the 
United Nations, in EssAYs ON INTERVENTION 81, 86 (Stanger ed. 1964). 
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affirmation and re-codification of the doctrine of non-intervention as 
they were with the creation of a system of collective defense. Neither 
the establishment of a world organization based upon the principles 
of the sovereign equality of states and the prohibition of the use of 
force against a state's territorial integrity or independence, nor the 
freedom-protecting character of the United States' new global role, 
were sufficient to assuage the traditional Latin American concern for 
legal protection from hegemonic interventionism. The days of 
Manifest Destiny were not so distant, and the success of the move-
ment against M onro{smo was all too recent, for the Latin Americans 
to abandon their efforts to codify the legal principles they deemed 
vital to their security and independence. 
A. The Enthronement of the Doctrine of Non-Intervention 
The Charter of the OAS (1948),16 pursuant to which the consulta-
tive machinery of the pre-war Pan Americanism was re-organized as 
a "regional arrangement" under the United Nations, codified once 
again the American international law doctrine of non-intervention. 
Articles 15 and 17 of the Charter give the doctrine its broadest 
formulation: 
Art. 15: No State or group of States has the right to intervene, di-
rectly or indirectly, for any reason whatever~ in the internal 
or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing prin-
ciple prohibits not only armed force but also any other form 
of interference or attempted threat against the personality 
of the State or against its political, economic and cultural 
elements. 
Art. 17: The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the ob-
ject, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other 
measures of force taken by another State, directly or in-
directly, on any ground whatsoever. No territorial acquisi-
tion or special advantages obtained either by force or by 
other means of coercion shall be recognized.17 
The other keystone of the modern inter-American system is provided 
by chapter V of the Charter, which incorporates by reference the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (the so-
called "Rio Treaty").18 As a result, the OAS may be regarded as both 
a "regional arrangement" under the United Nations Charter and an 
16. For a convenient text, see 46 AM. J. !NT'L L. 43 (Supp. 1952). 
17. Id. at 46-47. (Emphasis added.) 
18. 21 U.N.T.S. 77, 62 Stat. 1681 (1948). 
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organization for collective self-defense. The manifold implications 
of this dual role, and the extent to which the OAS may lawfully act 
to enforce its decisions with respect to the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security without the authorization of the Security 
Council of the United Nations, remain a subject of considerable 
controversy.18 They do not, however, directly concern us at this time. 
19. Under the Charter of the United Nations, a distinction may be drawn between 
"collective self-defense" organizations and so-called "regional arrangements." Article 
51 of the Charter provides that nothing in the Charter "shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations." International organizations constituted under this 
provision, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization, are required to report only to the Security Council on "measures taken 
in exercise of this right of self-defense." Chapter VIII of the Charter (articles 52-54), 
on the other hand, recognizes the complementary role of "regional arrangements or 
agencies" in "such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and 
security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or 
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations." Drafted in San Francisco to accommodate the demands of the states 
of the inter-American system for a special role in maintaining the peace and security 
of the Western Hemisphere, chapter VIII seeks to reach a compromise between the 
divergent demands of "regionalists" and "globalists." While article 24 of the Charter 
accords to the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security" (emphasis added), chapter VIII envisions prior recourse 
to an appropriate regional agency in the case of "local disputes." Under chapter VIII, 
moreover, provision is made for the use by the Security Council of regional agencies 
for enforcement action "under its [i.e., the Security Council's] authority," and en-
forcement action by a regional agency without the authorization of the Council is 
prohibited. 
The fundamental question of the extent to which a regional arrangement may 
operate independently of the universal organization has attracted much attention in 
recent years, particularly after the adoption of coercive measures by the OAS against 
the Dominican Republic (1960) and Cuba (1962) and the launching of "peacekeeping 
operations" in the Dominican Republic in 1965-1966. The discussion has centered on 
several related issues: whether action taken by the OAS constitutes "enforcement 
action" so as to require the authorization of the Security Council; whether, if it is 
to be considered "enforcement action," the Charter requires prior authorization by 
the Council; and whether the failure of the Security Council to take any action 
with respect to enforcement action undertaken by a regional agency (because of a 
veto or the threat of a veto by one of the permanent members) may be deemed to 
constitute authorization. In the case of the OAS, the matter is complicated by the 
additional factor that the inter-American system is organized not only as a "regional 
arrangement," but also, under the Rio Treaty of 1947, as a "collective self-defense" 
organization. The former Legal Adviser of the Department of State has likened the 
OAS to a "junior grade U.N." whose diplomatic and economic sanctions do not 
constitute "enforcement action" under the UN Charter and do not, therefore, require 
the authorization of the Security Council. He has offered the OAS as an "obvious 
candidate for the peacekeeping role within its regional terms of reference" in the 
light of the paralysis of the Security Council occasioned by the use or threat of the 
veto. See Remarks of Mr. Abram Chayes, then Legal Adviser of the Department of 
State, in The Inter-American Security System and the Cuban Crisis, .BACKGROUND 
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF nm THIRD HAMMARSKJOLD FORUM 37, 47-48 (Tondel ed. 
1964). Others have noted the OAS' similarities to NATO and the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization and have doubted the wisdom of according to such an organization 
the freedom of action that Mr. Chayes would allow to a putative "junior grade U.N." 
For discussions of the general problem, see ibid.; BEcKErr, THE Noam: ATI.AlllTic 
TREATY', THE .BRtlSSEI.S TREATY', AND THE C!LutTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1950); 
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For our present purposes it may be sufficient to note that the indi-
vidual and collective measures that may be taken under the Rio 
Treaty were intended to be limited to cases in which a state is sub-
jected to armed aggression, or to cases not involving armed aggression 
but affecting "the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the 
sovereignty or political independence of any American state .... "20 
It is apparent from its constituent instruments that, in its early 
years, the post-war inter-American system was primarily concerned 
with the maintenance by each state of absolute and exclusive author-
ity over its own territory, free of extra-continental or intra-conti-
nental intervention. It also seems clear that those who signed the 
OAS Charter in 1948 did not imagine that the OAS would be em-
powered to undertake "multilateral intervention" or "collective 
security action" against a member state of the Organization, except 
perhaps in the limited instance where a state's non-compliance with 
BOWETI, THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 135-38, 186-87 (1964 ed.); HIGGINS, 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS 169-70 (1963); Behr, Regional Organi:i:ations: A United Nations Prob-
lem, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 166 (1955); Halderman, Regional Enforcement .Measures and 
the United Nations, 52 GEo. L.J. 89 (1963). For the professedly "pragmatic" or 
non-"fundamentalist" view, assertedly based on the "working precepts of the American 
constitutional lawyer," one must tum to the speeches and writings of Professor Abram 
Chayes and Mr. Leonard Meeker, the present Legal Adviser of the Department of 
State. See Remarks of Mr. Abram Chayes, op. cit. supra; Chayes, The Legal Case for 
the U.S. Action in Cuba, 47 DEP'T STATE BuLL, 763 (1962); Remarks by Abram Chayes, 
1963 A.S.I.L. PROCEEDINGS 10; Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 515 (1963); Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of Inter-
national Law, 53 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 60 (1965). The subject is viewed from a different 
perspective by Henkin, Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary Inter-
national Law, 1963 A.S.I.L. PROCEEDINGS 147, and Friedmann, United States Policy and 
the Crisis of International Law, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 857 (1965). Professor Friedmann's 
article is a forceful critique of the Chayes-Meeker approach. 
20. Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, 21 U.N.T.S. 97 &: 99, 62 Stat. 1683 (1948). "In other 
words, the framers of the [Rio] Treaty did not intend to put into effect the sanctions 
enumerated in [article 6] unless the circumstances were of a serious and urgent 
character pressing, in a sense, upon the very political existence of the state." Fenwick, 
The Issues at Punta del Este: Non-Intervention v. Collective Security, 56 AM. J. !NT'L 
L. 469, 471 (1962). The Rio Treaty, as a recent but yet unpublished study of the concept 
of self-defense in the inter-American system has concluded, 
was not meant to provide .•• a sanctioning competence for the Inter-American 
System, but to build a structure for self-defence. Yet its application has been quite 
different, for the Treaty ·has been used more and more as a substitute for col-
lective security action and collective sanctions, becoming nowadays a punitive 
machinery and a device to redress the "wrong" done, even if no attempt has been 
made ••• to show that the OAS was faced by illegal conduct of the State concerned. 
Sepulveda, The Development of the Concept of Collective Self-Defence in the Prac-
tice of the Organization of American States (Dissertation submitted for the Diploma 
in International Law in the University of Cambridge, 1966). In any event, it should 
be noted that the Rio Treaty calls for individual action (as well as consultation) only 
in the case of an armed attack upon an American state. Article 6, encompassing any 
"fact or situation" other than an armed attack, and invoked by some in defense of 
the United States' unilateral action in the Dominican Republic in 1965, provides a 
basis only for consultation, and for collective action, at most. 
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the doctrine of non-intervention compelled corrective action by the 
OAS in order to sustain the doctrine. The scope of permissible 
"multilateral intervention" would presumably be limited further 
by article 17's explicit and blanket proscription of military occupa-
tion of a state-even temporarily and on any ground whatsoever. 
Unlike the UN Charter, the OAS Charter makes only the most 
cursory mention of human rights. Moreover, the scant references that 
do appear do not arise in any context which might conceivably be 
regarded as qualifying the doctrine of non-intervention. Rather, 
human rights are mentioned only in the ritualistic manner that has 
become a familiar, but meaningless, part of the pronouncements of 
international institutions since the end of World War II. While 
blandly proclaiming as a principle of the inter-American system "the 
fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, 
nationality, creed or sex,"21 the Charter does not indicate that either 
the promotion or the protection of human rights is one of the 
regional agency's purposes. It neither makes reference to, nor appears 
to envisage the creation of, a body within the Organization devoted 
exclusively to matters of human rights. It is significant that the 
principle of non-intervention apparently was intended to apply to 
the OAS itself, as well as to its individual members.22 And it is also 
noteworthy that when the American republics were called upon to 
consider two draft statements of principles drawn up by the Inter-
American Juridical Committee for the Bogota Conference of 1948-
one statement setting forth the "fundamental rights and duties of 
states" (including, inter alia, the doctrine of non-intervention), the 
other stating "the rights and duties of man"-they chose to incorpo-
rate the first but not the second into the OAS Charter. The statement 
of principles on human rights was issued separately as the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.23 
The constituent instruments of the inter-American system reveal 
the unwillingness of the Latin American states to qualify the prin-
21. Article 5(j) of the OAS Charter, reprinted in 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (Supp. 1952). 
22. One critic of the doctrine of absolute non-intervention has reluctantly con-
cluded: 
Whether one regards the OAS as a jural personality distinct from the legal per-
sonalities of the individual states of which it is composed or merely as an associated 
group of states having no existence apart from its members, it is clear that the 
organization as well as its members is bound by the principle of non-intervention. 
Thomas, Non-Intervention and Public Order in the Americas, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. 
Soc'y OF INT'L L. 72, 75 (1959). Elsewhere the same author has concluded that as a 
result of the OAS' apparent proscription of all forms of intervention "human rights are 
now less protected than they were under general international law." THOMAS &: 
THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 390 (1956). 
23. Op. cit. supra note I; see Fenwick, The Ninth International Conference of 
American States, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 553, 563 (1948). 
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ciple of non-intervention any more than is absolutely required by a 
collective defense system. If, as Professor Thomas has argued, the 
"absolute doctrine [of non-intervention] creates difficulties for a sys-
tem of public order ... [because] [i]t makes impossible the complete 
protection through the legal process of 'basic goal values' of the 
community"24-which he takes to include human rights and repre-
sentative democracy-one must conclude either that the doctrine of 
absolute non-intervention was specifically intended to create just 
such difficulties or that these "basic goal values" were not deemed 
sufficiently clear or compelling to warrant a provision for protective 
intervention. Without unduly stretching the limits of credibility, 
one might consider the possibility that the doctrine of absolute non-
intervention was simply intended to prevent the hemisphere's domi-
nant power, or a group of states allied to that power, from deciding 
what these "basic goal values" are and then compelling conformity 
from the other states in the inter-American system. Moreover, there 
is considerable evidence to contradict the proposition that the promo-
tion or protection of human rights and representative democracy 
in the member states was an avowed "goal value" of the OAS. The 
all-embracing provisions on non-intervention in the OAS Charter 
and the evident lack of enthusiasm of its drafters for giving the 
regional agency a human rights role merely confirmed the defeat 
several years earlier of the so-called Rodriguez Larreta Doctrine, 
which would have permitted multilateral intervention in cases where 
the violations of human rights were deemed to affect the peace of the 
Americas. As J. C. Dreier has observed: "The potential dangers in-
herent in permitting any kind of intervention were considered 
greater than the evils which intervention under the Rodriguez 
Larreta Doctrine was intended to correct."25 Thus, during the years 
24. Thomas, Non-Intervention and Public Order in the Americas, PROCEEDINGS OF 
nm AM. Soc'y OF INT'L L. 72, 73 (1959). 
25. DREIER, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE HEMISPHERE CRISIS 95 
(1962). The proposal of Dr. Rodriguez Larreta, the Foreign Minister of Uruguay, for 
"multilateral intervention" in defense of human rights, was contained in a note sent 
to all of the American republics in November 1945. It constituted a thinly-veiled con-
demnation of the Per6n regime of Argentina and envisaged consultations and collec-
tive action against governments which violated American "democratic solidarity" and 
fundamental freedoms. Although the United States was apparently somewhat recep• 
tive to the proposal, only three Latin American states (Guatemala, Panama, and 
Venezuela) supported the Uruguayan initiative. See RONNING, LAW AND PoLITICS IN 
INTER-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 68-69, 80 (1963). A related development was the rejection 
by the Mexico City Conference in 1945 of a Guatemalan proposal that the American 
states resolve not to recognize "anti-democratic" governments. This relatively modest 
form of "multilateral intervention" was similarly rejected as inconsistent with the 
American law of non-intervention. The task of defining "democratic" and "anti• 
democratic" regimes was regarded as too subjective and unworkable. Ball, Issue for 
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between the Bogota Conference, which established the Organization, 
and the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
in Santiago, Chile, in 1959, the OAS' indifference toward a human 
rights program closely paralleled its own generally strict adherence 
to the principle of non-intervention.26 
It should be mentioned that one small spark of interest in a 
human rights role for the regional agency had been revealed in 1948 
by the promulgation of the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man and the adoption of a recommendation that human 
rights be protected by a juridical organ and that "where inter-
nationally recognized rights are concerned, juridical protection, to 
be effective, should emanate from an international organ."27 In 
addition, the Inter-American Juridical Committee was asked to pre-
pare a draft statute for an Inter-American Court for the Protection 
of the Rights of Man.28 However, the vagueness of the resolution, the 
haphazard manner of its adoption, and the subsequent relegation of 
the Americas: Non-Intervention v. Human Rights and the Preservation of Democratic 
Institutions, 15 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 21, 22-23 (1961). On more recent efforts 
to revive the idea of collective action, in the form of non-recognition, against regimes 
that have seized power from democratically-elected and constitutional governments, 
see Fenwick, The Recognition of De Facto Governments: Is There a Basis for Inter-
American Collective Action?, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (1964). Apparently oblivious to 
these revealing decisions with respect to multilateral action in defense of human 
rights and democratic institutions, Professor Macdonald has categorically asserted 
that "there is no doubt that the O.A.S. can take common action to protect human 
rights under article 19 [of the OAS Charter]." Macdonald, The Organization of 
American States in Action, 15 U. TORONTO L.J. 359-70 (1964). Article 19 of the 
OAS Charter states that "Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security 
in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles 
set forth in Articles 15 and 17 [on non-intervention and territorial inviolability, 
respectively]." However, the very fact that the enforcement measures permitted by 
the Rio Treaty and the United Nations Charter are thereby excluded from the doctrine 
of non-intervention as formulated in the OAS Charter has convinced Professor 
Thomas of the intention of the framers to bind the OAS itself to the doctrine of non-
intervention in matters not directly related to enforcement measures or the inherent 
right of self-defense. Thomas, Non-Intervention and Public Order in the Americas, 
PROCEEDINGS OF nm AM. Soc'y OF INT'L L. 72, 75 (1959). 
26. This is not to suggest that the OAS had, until then, effectively prevented the 
alleged interventionist acts of member states, but merely that the Organization itself 
had remained generally free of charges of interventionism. 
27. Resolution XX.XI, Ninth International Conference of American States, 13ogota, 
Colombia, March 30-May 2, 1948, Final Act (Pan-American Union 1948), p. 45, quoted 
in Fenwick, The Ninth International Conference of American States, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 
553, 563 (1948); sec Inter-American Juridical Committee, Report to the Inter-American 
Council of Jurists Concerning Resolution XXXI of the Bogota Conference (Inter-
American Court To Protect the Rights of Man), reprinted in ANUARIO JURIDICO INTER· 
AMERICA.NO, 1949, at 298 (1950). 
28. Resolution XXXI, Ninth International Conference of American States, op. cit. 
supra note 27. See also Freeman, The First Meeting of the Inter-American Council of 
Jurists, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 374-, 380 (1950); Kunz, The Bogota Charter and the Organiza-
tion of American States, 42 A?.r. J. INT'L L. 568, 573 (1948). 
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the subject to a position of insignificance in the work program of the 
OAS' juridical bodies made it apparent that the proposal was not 
intended to be taken very seriously. Indeed, the draft statute that the 
Inter-American Juridical Committee was asked to prepare was not 
to be considered by a ministerial-level conference until its submis-
sion to the next Inter-American Conference, scheduled for five years 
later, and even then, it was merely to be "studied" by that Confer-
ence. Consequently, this one spark of interest in a human rights 
program was quickly dashed by the Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee, which reported unanimously to the Inter-American Council 
of Jurists (its parent body) that, in the absence of a body of positive 
law that might serve as a basis for developing measures of implemen-
tation, the Committee would be unable to prepare the draft statute 
requested by the Bogota Conference.29 Clearly, the American Decla-
ration of the Rights and Duties of Man was not regarded as a suffi-
cient foundation on which to build. 
In their movement to codify, in much-expanded form, the doc-
trine of non-intervention enunciated by Drago, the Latin Americans 
had effectively prohibited only the more obvious forms of "inter-
vention." However, their efforts to codify the much broader principle 
of non-intervention formulated by Calvo, which in its strictest form 
would prohibit recourse by aliens to diplomatic interposition in any 
matter justiciable in an American republic, were begun as early as 
the first Pan American Conference in 1889. Moreover, despite the 
firm and continued opposition of the United States and the great 
majority of non-Latin American authorities in international law, 
Latin American states have persistently adhered to the Calvo Doc-
trine, have embodied it in countless constitutions, and have con-
tinued to make frequent use of it (through the so-called "Calvo 
Clause") in concession agreements with foreign corporations.30 In-
deed, their efforts to codify the Calvo Doctrine as a principle of 
29. Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 27; Freeman, supra note 28, 
at 381. 
30. See .BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 12, at 792; 1 CALVO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE §§ 204-05 (5th ed. 1896); 3 id. § 1278; 6 id. § 256. An early 
and classic statement of the Calvo Doctrine is offered by Harmodio Arias (later 
president of the Republic of Panama), The Non-Liability of States for Damages 
Suffered by Foreigners in the Course of a Riot, an Insurrection, or a Civil War, 7 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 724 (1913). See also Freeman, Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and 
the Challenge to International Law, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1946); Lipstein, The Place 
of the Calvo Clause in International Law, 1945 13RIT. YB. INT'L L. 130. Professor Paul 
Henri Laurent has traced the origins of the doctrine attributed to Calvo to indemnifi-
cation cases arising from the 13elgian independence war of 1830. Laurent, State 
Responsibility: A Possible Historic Precedent to the Calvo Clause, 15 !NT'L &: CoMP. 
L,Q. 395 (1966). 
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American international law continued unabated after the successful 
codification of the narrower principle of non-intervention and have 
persisted to this day as one of their major political objectives. 
As recently as September, 1965, a juridical body of the OAS 
re-affirmed in the strongest terms the principle that, in the Western 
Hemisphere, there exists no duty imposed by international law that 
aliens be given treatment in any wise different from that accorded 
to nationals. The Inter-American Juridical Committee re-asserted 
the traditional Latin American reluctance to have their municipal 
administration of justice judged by any standard other than their 
own and strenuously rejected the theory of state responsibility for 
a denial of justice to aliens.81 It pointedly declared: "In contrast to 
the Latin American position, that of the United States is one of con-
tinuing to apply nineteenth-century standards set by the European 
powers, in order to assure a privileged status to foreign firms and to 
their nationals settled or domiciled abroad."82 Identifying the Latin 
American viewpoint with that of other "new countries," the Com-
mittee added: 
There is no novelty in the United States position regarding standards 
that have been praised by the greater powers, standards that their 
jurists classify as part of universal international law, or simply, with 
unparalleled modesty, as international law itself. 
In these circumstances, those who stubbornly hold to obsolete ideas 
that are now totally without foundation-if they ever had any, from 
the moral point of view-can make no contribution to the develop-
ment of international law in the subject of which we speak. Rather, 
the contribution must be made by those who want to establish a dif-
ferent structure that will take into account the presence in the world 
of new countries and new situations.ss 
Viewed from the perspective of the historic commitment of the 
Latin American states to a doctrine of non-intervention that some 
have come to regard as a doctrine of international irresponsibility, 84 
31. Inter-American Juridical Committee, Contribution of the American Continent 
to the Principles of International Law That Govern the Responsibility of the State, 
OAS OFFICIAL REcoRDs, OEA/Ser. I/VI.2 (English), CIJ-78 (Sept. 1965). On the work 
of the Inter-American Juridical Committee and its parent body, see Freeman, The 
Contribution of the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Inter-American 
Council of Jurists to the Codification and Development of International Law, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE AM. Soc'y OF INT'L L. 14 (1965). 
32. Inter-American Juridical Committee, op. dt. supra note 31, at 5. 
33. Id. at 5-6. (Emphasis added.) 
34. See, e.g., the views of Freeman in Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the 
Challenge to International Law, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1946); and in The Contribution 
of the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Inter-American Council of Jurists 
to the Codification and Development of International Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. 
Soc'y OF INT'L L. 21-22 (1965); and the dissehting views of Professor James O. Murdock, 
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it is not difficult to comprehend why, as late as 1959, the inter-
American system remained relatively unconcerned with the promo-
tion of human rights and representative democracy in member states. 
However, in 1959, certain events occurred which altered that 
situation. 
B. The Decline of Absolute Non-Intervention 
The OAS' indifference toward human rights problems first 
showed significant signs of breaking down in August, 1959, when the 
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was 
convened in Santiago, Chile, to consider the political tension in the 
Caribbean area. The Santiago conference was primarily concerned 
with Venezuela's charge that the Trujillo regime of the Dominican 
Republic had attempted to undermine the government of Venezuela 
and to assassinate its chief executive. For the previous three decades, 
the Trujillo government had been the eyesore of the American con-
tinent, but, undoubtedly because Trujilloism was not an expansion-
ist idealogy and had remained an insular phenomenon, the OAS had 
never resolved (as it was later to do in the case of Cuban communism) 
that the Dominican government was incompatible with the inter-
American system, and the OAS had never before considered corrective 
action. However, the alleged external terrorist activities of the Tru-
jillo regime began to turn the OAS toward the view that violations 
of human rights and denials of democratic freedoms within member 
states might affect the peace of the Americas and might thus become 
a proper concern of the Organization. It is important to stress, how-
ever, that it was the Dominican regime's alleged violation of the non-
intervention doctrine itself that first prompted the OAS to examine 
its role in promoting respect for human rights. 
As the preamble to the Declaration of Santiago indicates, the 
representatives to the Fifth Meeting of Consultation concluded that 
the peace of the Americas "can be effective only insofar as human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the exercise of representative 
democracy are a reality within each one of them."35 They decided 
the North American member of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, in Contribu-
tion of the American Continent to the Principles of International Law That Govern 
the Responsibility of the State, OAS OFFICIAL RECORDS, OEA/Ser. I/VI.2 (English), 
CIJ-61 (Jan. 1962). 
35. Declaration of Santiago, Chile (1959), OAS, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs Aug. 12-18, 1959, Final Act, OEA/Ser. C/II.5 (English), p. 5, 
reprinted in 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 537, 538 (1961). The charges against the Trujillo regime 
were referred to the Inter-American Peace Committee, which reported in June 1960 
that "flagrant and widespread violations of human rights" in the Dominican Republic 
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that treaty obligations insuring respect for human rights and repre-
sentative democracy were wanting36 and consequently asked the Inter-
American Council of Jurists to prepare a draft Inter-American Con-
vention on Human Rights modeled after the work of the United 
Nations and the Council of Europe. The Council was also asked to 
prepare an instrument creating an Inter-American Court for the 
Protection of Human Rights37 and it was resolved to establish an 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, composed of seven 
members elected in their individual capacity by the OAS Council.38 
The mandate of the new Commission was vague-"to promote 
respect for human rights" and to "develop an awareness of human 
rights among the peoples of America"-and the OAS Council was 
assigned the task of preparing the Commission's statute. 
The Inter-American Council of Jurists, meeting in Santiago after 
the Meeting of Consultation, promptly prepared a draft convention 
on human rights, including a separate chapter on civil and political 
rights and another on economic, social, and cultural rights. The draft 
convention provided for an Inter-American Commission for the 
had aggravated international tensions in the Caribbean, and concluded that the 
Dominican Republic had been guilty of "acts of intervention and aggression" against 
Venezuela. In August 1960, the Organ of Consultation of the OAS, in its first sub• 
stantial departure from the doctrine of absolute non-intervention, imposed sanctions 
for the first time on a member of the organization. It is siguificant that, in this first 
departure from the doctrine, the issue of human rights violations by the Dominican 
regime was very much intertwined with the larger question of aggression and inter-
vention by the Trujillo government. For the text of the Organ's resolution, see 43 
DEP'T STATE BULL. 358 (1960). See generally .Ball, supra note 25. 
36. Citing the work of the United Nations and the Council of Europe, the Meeting 
concluded "that eleven years after the proclamation of the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of man, ••• the climate in this hemisphere is ready for the 
conclusion of a convention •.• .'' Declaration of Santiago, Chile, supra note 35, at 11, 
quoted in ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 174 (1963). 
37. Declaration of Santiago, Chile, Resolution VIII, Part I, op. cit. supra note 35, 
at 11, reprinted in OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Council of the 
Organization, OEA/Ser. D /III.12 (English) (1960), p. 21. The Meeting had groped 
for a formula that would, in the words of Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, 
"harmonize the common desire to preserve human rights inviolate with absolute respect 
for the principle of non-intervention." The Times (London), Aug. 13, 1959, p. 8, col. 4. 
See also id., Aug. 19 & 21, 1959. "The Latin Americans," Miss .Ball has quite ac-
curately noted, "have not always recognized the existence of a conflict, or po-
tential conflict, between the principle of non-intervention and the protection of 
human rights and democratic institutions.'' .Ball, supra note 25, at 29. This is amply 
verified by the work of the Inter-American Juridical Committee over the decades. See, 
e.g., Inter-American Juridical Committee, Differences Between Intervention and Collec-
tive Action, OAS OFFICIAL REcoRDs, OEA/Ser. I/VI.2 (English), CIJ-81 (Jan. 1966) . .But 
in view of the position taken by the Secretary of State of the United States in 1959, and 
in the light of developments since 1959, the same conclusion would seem to be appli-
cable to the North Americans as well. See note 70 infra. 
38. Declaration of Santiago, Chile, Resolution VIII, Part II, op. cit. supra note 35, 
at 11, reprinted in OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Council of the 
Organization, OEA/Scr. D/III.12 (English) (1960), p. 19. 
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Protection of Human Rights and for an Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. These institutions were expected to function sub-
stantially like the comparable bodies in the human rights machinery 
of the Council of Europe. 
The draft convention floundered in different organs of the OAS 
for seven years, and it was only at the Second Special Inter-American 
Conference, held in Rio de Janeiro in November, 1965, that there 
was some indication that it might soon emerge from the wilderness. 
The Rio Conference sent the 1959 draft convention and two other 
draft conventions offered by Chile and Uruguay to the Council of 
the Organization, which was asked to consider the drafts, to hear 
the views of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 
other interested organs, and to complete the necessary revisions of 
the convention within one year. The Conference's resolution also 
provides that, within three months of completion, the draft conven-
tion is to be submitted to governments for observations and sug-
gested amendments. Within a further thirty days, the Council is to 
convoke an Inter-American Specialized Conference to approve and 
sign a convention on human rights.39 
The Commission created at Santiago in 1959 assumed a surpris-
ingly vigorous role in the fulfillment of its vague mandate to "promote 
respect for human rights." The Council had not carefully defined 
the Commission's precise role or its rules of procedure.40 Rather, it 
merely stated that the Commission was to be "an autonomous entity 
of the Organization of American States, the function of which is to 
promote respect for human rights."41 Its functions and powers were 
stated in similarly vague fashion,42 and some of those omitted were 
39. Second Special Inter-American Conference, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Nov. 17-30, 
1965, Final Act, Resolution XXIV, OEA/Ser. C/I.13 (English). At last report, the 
Commission on Human Rights had finished its consideration of the Draft Convention 
and had submitted an opinion on it to the Council of the OAS, which is still consider-
ing the Draft Convention. Letter from Dr. Luis Reque, Executive Secretary of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, to Jose Cabranes, March 22, 1967. 
40. For the act authorizing the creation of the Commission, see OEA/Ser. L/V /I.I 
(1960). 
41. Id. art. I. 
42. Id. art. 9, stating the Commission's functions and powers, deserves to be quoted 
at length: 
a. To develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America; 
b. To make recommendations to the governments of the member states in general, 
if it considers such action advisable, for the adoption of progressive measures 
in favor of human rights within the framework of their domestic legislation 
and, in accordance with their constitutional precepts, approprite measures to 
further the faithful observance of those rights; [Emphasis added.] 
c. To prepare such studies or reports as it considers advisable in the performance 
of its duties; 
d. To urge the governments of the member states to supply it with information 
on the measures adopted by them in matters of human rights; 
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at least as significant as those enumerated. Its mandate remained 
the promotion of human rights; nothing was said of the protection 
of these rights. Moreover, the important power to consider petitions 
from individuals and organizations failed to gain the approval of the 
Council.48 
Under the circumstances, it was perhaps natural that the Com-
mission should resort to improvisation in defining its role. At its first 
session, it resolved to interpret its mandate broadly. While acknowl-
edging that it was not "empowered to make any individual decision 
regarding the written communications or claims that it receives in-
volving the violation of human rights in the American states," the 
Commission decided that "for the most effective fulfillment of its 
functions, .•• [it would] take cognizance of them by way of informa-
tion. "44 It thereupon interpreted article 9(b) of its statute to mean 
that it could address general recommendations to individual mem-
bers of the OAS (not merely to all of them collectively) based upon 
the information it had obtained. Also at the first session, the Com-
mission "took note" of thirty communications regarding alleged 
violations of human rights in American states, thereby taking the 
first cautious steps in the direction of the protection as well as the 
promotion of human rights in the American continent. Yet the 
Commission remained so dubious of its powers that it requested from 
the outset that the OAS Council explicitly allow it to "examine com-
munications or claims directed to it by any person or group of 
persons."4IS Although this authority was not formally granted until 
the Second Special Inter-American Conference of 1965,46 the Com-
mission's procedure of "taking note" of petitions and addressing to 
member states recommendations based upon them amounted to the 
same thing. This practice had become so familiar by 1961 that the 
Secretary-General of the OAS could casually observe that "from the 
e. To serve the Organization of American States as an advisory body in respect 
of human rights. 
In the performance of its functions, the Commission is directed by article 10 to act 
"in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the Organization and 
bear in mind particularily that, in conformity with the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, the rights of each man are limited by the rights of 
others •••• " OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Council of the 
Organization, OEA/Ser. D/IlI.12 (English) (1960), p. 19. 
43. Scheman, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 
8!15, !188 (1965). 
44. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accom• 
plished During Its First Session, October 3-28, 1960, OEA/Ser. L/V /Il.1, Doc. 82 
(English), p. 18. (Emphasis added.) · 
45. Id. at 10. 
46. Second Special Inter-American Conference, op. cit. supra note 88, Resolution 
xxn. The text of the resolution appears at 60 AM. J. hrr'L L. 458 (1966). 
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beginning [the Commission] attended to private individuals' peti-
tions and protests on violations of human rights, both in Cuba and 
the Dominican Republic."47 
Thus, from its inception, the Commission became involved on an 
ad hoc basis in the protection of fundamental rights during periods 
of internal turmoil in member states. Alongside a modest program 
devoted to the general study and promotion of human rights,48 the 
Commission has attempted on a case-by-case basis to use its informa-
tion-gathering power, its authority to make recommendations to 
states on measures that might be taken in favor of human rights 
"within the framework of their domestic legislation,"49 and its dis-
cretionary power to make public its recommendations and conclu-
sions, to protect human rights within member states. The Commis-
sion and its secretariat also have undertaken the task of compiling 
information on alleged violations of human rights in member states. 
Between the Commission's sessions, the secretariat devotes much of 
its time to "attending to complaints and claims of violations of 
human rights, as well as listing communications received in this 
regard .... "50 TJ?.e Commission has frequently heard oral testimony 
of opposition groups and has followed up complaints against the 
government of a member state by requesting relevant information. 
It has also requested permission to hold sessions, for informational 
47. OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Council of the Organi:ation, 
OEA/Ser. D/III.l!I, Introduction (1961). In 196!1 the Secretary-General of the OAS is 
reported to have "pointed out that the work performed by the Commission responded 
to the requirements of the American peoples, and that the organizations that were 
created with vitality and greatness, as was the case with the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, could not be limited by the simple device of regulations." He 
reportedly went on to express confidence that the Commission would "extend its 
activities in behalf of human rights and the effective exercise of democracy." Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During 
Its Sixth Session, April 16 to May 8, 196], OEA/Ser. L/V/ll.7, Doc. 28 (Aug. 21, 196!1), 
p. 2. (Emphasis added.) Behind the Secretary-General's rhetoric lies a dear-cut recogni-
tion that the Commission's work was largely improvisatory and unfettered by any of 
the statutes or regulations formulated by the political organs of the OAS. 
48. The Commission's "work program" is, in reality, a program of special studies 
undertaken by different members. They include, inter alia, "the political, economic, 
and social conditions of the countries of Latin America that may influence human 
rights;" "[the] relation between the promotion and protection of human rights and the 
effective exercise of democracy;" and a "comparative study of the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
corresponding constitutional texts of the American States." Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During Its Third Session, 
October 2 to November 4, 1961, OEA/Ser. L/V /II.3, Doc. 82 (Nov. 4, 1961), pp. l!l-14. 
49. See article 9(b) of the act authorizing the creation of the Commission, quoted 
in note 42 supra. 
50. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accom-
plished During Its Third Session, October 2 to November 4, l961, OEA/Ser. L/V JIU, 
Doc. 82 (Nov. 4, 1961), p. 8. 
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purposes, in states charged with violating human rights, 51 and, 
where it has deemed it necessary, the Commission has transmitted to 
those states recommendations for corrective action. 
The Commission's ad hoc approach to the protection of human 
rights is best illustrated by its activities with respect to human rights 
in Cuba and in the Dominican Republic. During its third session in 
1961, the Commission sent a note to the Government of Cuba 
requesting information "on some of the more urgent claims," and 
suggested to that government that "if the imputations made to the 
Commission were correct ... [it should] adopt 'progressive measures 
favoring human rights' within Cuban domestic law."52 Not long 
thereafter, the Commission intervened in the aftermath of the abor-
tive 1961 invasion of Cuba to request of the Cuban Government 
that "the proceedings initiated against the prisoners of the Bay of Pigs 
be in accordance with the obligations contained in Article 26 of the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man."53 The 
51. For example, in response to communications from Haitian exiles claiming wide• 
spread violations of human rights in that republic, the Commission in 1962 requested 
the permission of the Government of Haiti to hold part of its fifth session there. 
This request was denied by the Foreign Minister of Haiti, who charged that the 
Commission was interferring in the internal affairs of Haiti. In a subsequent note to 
the Government of Haiti, the Commission re-asserted its constitutional authority to 
undertake such visits, but grudgingly acquiesced in the face of the refusal of the 
Haitian Government to grant its consent. A similar request was made in 1962 of the 
Government of Nicaragna, which initially agreed to permit the Commission to sit 
in the capital city of Managua, but not before the scheduled presidential elections 
there (as the Commission had explicitly requested). Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During Its Fifth Session, Septem-
ber 24 to October 26, 1962, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.5, Doc. 40 (Feb. 18, 1963), pp. 7, 9, 10-12, 
15. When the Nicaraguan Government refused a second request to visit Managua before 
the Nicaraguan presidential election (in response to charges of intimidation of voters 
and other violations of human rights), the Commission concluded that "the [Nicara-
guan] Government did not look with sympathy upon the Commission's holding part 
of its session on Nicaraguan territory for the purpose of ascertaining in reality whether 
human rights were observed in that country," and expressed regret that it had been 
prevented "from confirming whether the electoral process in Nicaragua was in accord 
with the provisions of Article 20 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man, approved at Bogota [in 1948] with the affirmative vote of Nicaragua." Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During 
Its First Special Session, January 2 to 23, 1963, OEA/ Ser. L/V /11.6, Doc. 18 (April 25, 
1963), p. 6. 
52. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accom-
plished During Its Third Session, October 2 to November 4, 1961, OEA/Ser. L/V/11.3, 
Doc. 32 (Nov. 4, 1961), p. 10. 
53. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation Regard-
ing Human Rights in the Republic of Cuba, OEA/Ser. L/V /11.4, Doc. 30 (May I, 
1962), pp. 6-7. Article 26 of the American Declaration, Resolution XXX, Ninth Inter-
national Conference of American States, Bogota, Columbia, March 30-May 2, 1948, 
Final Act (Pan-American Union 1948), p. 43, reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 133 
(Supp. 1949), reads: 
Every accused person is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty. 
Every person accused of an offense has the right to be given an impartial and 
public hearing, and to be tried by courts previously established in accordance with 
pre-existing law, and not to receive cruel, infamous or unusual punishment. 
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Commission also asked that the Cuban Government refrain from 
applying the death penalty to these prisoners. The Foreign Minister 
of Cuba challenged the Commission's authority to propose the ap-
plication of "alien norms to matters in the internal jurisdiction of 
the Cuban Government" and denounced the Commission for its 
readiness to intervene on behalf of the invaders while not comment-
ing on the invasion itself. 54 The Commission replied 
that it lacks competence to investigate the siutation referred to in the 
second part of [the Cuban Foreign Minister's] communication, which 
inures to the other organs of the Inter-american system; but it does 
have competence to formulate recommendations to the governments 
of the American states in cases such as those contemplated in the 
cablegram to the Government of Cuba [that is, with respect to the 
prisoners of the Bay of Pigs].55 
Powerless to proceed any further with the matter, the Commission 
merely made public its exchange of communications with the Cuban 
Government and expressed "profound concern" that the proceedings 
against the prisoners had apparently not conformed to article 26 of 
'the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
In 1962 the Commission formally requested permission from the 
Cuban Government to hold one of its sessions in Cuba in pursuance 
of its statutory fact-gathering function. This request went unan-
swered. 58 In 1963, however, with the permission of the United States 
Government, the Commission held its first special session in Miami, 
Florida, where a subcommittee conducted hearings on the situation 
of political prisoners and their families in Cuba, accumulating evi-
dence from more than eighty exiled Cubans. The result was a long 
report which embodied much of the testimony collected by the 
Commission and enumerated instances of violations of human 
rights. 57 The report also charged the Cuban Government with lack 
of cooperation. 
The Commission's varied activities in the Dominican Republic 
during the past several years is perhaps most illustrative of its capacity 
to improvise while attempting to protect human rights during domes-
tic political turmoil. In October, 1961, during a period of political 
unrest following the assassination of Generalissimo Trujillo, the 
54. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, op. cit. supra note 53, at 7, 
55. Ibid. 
56. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accom• 
plished During Its Fifth Session, September Z4 to October Z6, 196Z, OEA/Ser. L/V /II!,, 
Doc. 40 (Feb. 18, 196!1), p. 16. 
57. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of 
Political Prisoners and Their Relatives in Cuba, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.7, Doc. 4 (May 17, 
196!1). 
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Commission was allowed to visit the Dominican Republic in order 
"to enlarge its study of the situation regarding human rights in that 
country with an on-the-spot analysis of facts denounced in numerous 
communications."58 During its visit, the Commission conducted a 
series of interviews with government and opposition groups in the 
capital and in provincial cities; it received written and verbal com-
plaints of violations of human rights; and, shortly before departing 
for Washington, it gave the Dominican Foreign Ministry a list of 
persons who were apparently under detention by the regime but 
whose whereabouts were unknown. Upon its return to Washington, 
the Commission drafted a note to the Government of the Dominican 
Republic, bringing to its attention a series of abridgments of human 
rights which were observed during its visit.59 The Commission sub-
sequently issued a report60 in which it condemned the regime of the 
late Generalissimo Trujillo for "the most flagrant violations of 
human rights" and noted that "serious violations continued" under 
the incumbent regime of Dr. Joaquin Balaguer.61 
In late April, 1965, an uprising in the Dominican Republic pre-
cipitated the unilateral armed intervention of the United States. 
This intervention, the first of its kind in more than three decades, 
has at different times been supported by high officials of the United 
States Government as a humanitarian intervention and as an effort 
to prevent "the establishment of another communist government in 
the Western Hemisphere."62 The United States' action was subse-
quently approved by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, which agreed to send a conciliation group to the 
Dominican Republic. The Meeting subsequently established an 
Inter-American Peace Force, whose purpose would be 
that of co-operating in the restoration of normal conditions in the 
Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants 
58. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accom-
plished During Its Third Session, October 2 to November 4, 1961, OEA/ Ser. L/V /Il.3, 
Doc. 32 (Nov. 4, 1961), p. 4. 
59. Id. at 6-7. 
60. Report on the Situation Regarding Human Rights in the Dominican Republic, 
OEA/Ser. L/V/II.4, Doc. 32 (May 22, 1962). 
61. In 1963, a complaint to the OAS Secretary-General by four leaders of political 
organizations in the Dominican Republic was referred to the Commission, which was 
then in the midst of its sixth session. With the permission of the Dominican Govern-
ment, the Commission travelled for a second time to the Dominican Republic. After 
discussions with all sides to the controversy, the Commission withdrew without further 
comment. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accom-
plished During Its Sixth Session, April 16 to May 8, 1963, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.7, Doc. 28 
(Aug. 21, 1963), p. 14. 
62. The late Adlai E. Stevenson, then ambassador of the United States to the United 
Nations, quoted in The Times (London), May 4, 1965, p. 12, col. 5. 
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and the inviolability of human rights, and the establishment of an 
atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the function-
ing of democratic institutions.63 
The events which led to the collapse of the doctrine of absolute 
non-intervention and the full-bodied re-emergence of the doctrine 
of "counter-intervention" were also the occasion for the most dramatic 
and significant chapter in the seven-year history of the Inter-Amer-
ican Commission on Human Rights. On May 25, 1965, the Secretary-
General of the OAS requested that the Commission on Human 
Rights send a delegation to Santo Domingo. Its presence was "essen-
tial and urgent," said the Secretary-General, "in view of numerous 
denunciations of violations of human rights formulated by both 
parties."64 By June l, 1965, the chairman and executive secretary of 
the Commission had arrived to assist the other OAS groups in the 
Dominican Republic in fulfilling the Organization's objective of 
protecting human rights and establishing "an atmosphere . . . that 
will permit the functioning of democratic institutions." The Com-
mission's work was, necessarily, wholly improvised. It interviewed 
representatives of both factions and secured their signatures on a 
document which bound their "governments" to respect the prin-
ciples embodied in the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man and "to provide the Commission with all the facilities 
essential for the fulfillment of its mission."65 The Commission visited 
places of detention of both factions and, in some instances, procured 
the release of prisoners; it negotiated permission for the unloading of 
ships carrying food and medicines; it secured diplomatic asylum in 
the embassies of other American republics for diverse political figures 
and secured for others permission to leave the Dominican Republic. 
In a report on his labors in the Dominican Republic, the chair-
man recommended that a "representation" of the Commission re-
main in that country "continuously, for the purpose of observing and 
solving problems relating to human rights."66 He later recommended 
that the Commission remain in the Dominican Republic "in order 
to watch over the rights of the individual in accordance with the 
precepts of the Commission itself, and providing that it is so auth~-
63. OAS, Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Doc. 39 
(English) Rev. Corr. (1965), reprinted in 52 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 863 (May 31, 1965), and 
59 AM. J. INT'L L. 987 (1965); and in 4 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 594 (1965). 
(Emphasis added.) 
64. OAS, Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Situation 
Regarding Human Rights in the Dominican Republic (Preliminary Report), OEA/Ser. 
L/V /II.12, Doc. 2 Rev. Gune 23, 1965), p. I. 
65. Id. at 5-6. 
66. Id. at 22. 
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rized by the provisional government that is established in the 
Dominican Republic."67 On September 27, 1965, the Provisional 
Government of the Dominican Republic-constituted by an OAS-
procured agreement of all factions to govern the country until the 
elections scheduled for June I, 1966-invited the Commission to 
remain in the country until the freely elected government was in-
stalled in power. The Commission promptly accepted the invitation 
to continue its informal efforts to protect human rights. 
The Commission's role in the aftermath of the civil strife and 
unilateral intervention of the United States has been described by 
one of its own members, without undue exaggeration, as "the most 
constructive contribution of the inter-American system in the Domin-
ican Republic."68 It is significant, however, that a report by the same 
member on the Commission's work in the Dominican Republic, in-
cluding a description of the legal bases for the Commission's activities 
there, has been kept confidential, available only for the use of the 
members of the Commission. 69 
Nonetheless, the doubts which may have existed concerning the 
Commission's improvisations over the past seven years appear to have 
been largely dispelled by the action taken by the Second Special 
Inter-American Conference, held in Rio de Janeiro in November, 
1965.70 In effect, the Conference confirmed the powers which the 
Commission had already exercised on the basis of its own liberal 
interpretation of its statute. 
III. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
The new interest of the OAS in a program to promote human 
rights in the Western Hemisphere has accompanied the erosion since 
1959 of the doctrine of absolute non-intervention. Although the lit-
any of absolute non-intervention continues to be sung in the foreign 
ministries of all the American republics, regardless of their views 
of the recent events, and although a high official of the Department 
of State responsible for the direction of Latin American policy has 
vigorously denied (even after the Dominican affair of 1965-1966) that 
the doctrine of non-intervention is obsolete,71 there seems to be little 
67. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accom-
plished During Its Eleventh Session (Special), July 21 to 23, 1965, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.12, 
Doc. 10 (Sept. 20, 1965), p. 6. (Emphasis added.) 
68. Dr. Carlos Dunshee de Abranches of Brazil, in id. at 7. 
69. Id. at 6. 
70. Second Special Inter-American Conference, op. cit. supra note 39, Resolution 
XXII, reprinted in 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 445, 458 (1966). 
71. Mr. Thomas C. Mann, then Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and 
generally acknowledged to be a principal spokesman and policy-maker with respect 
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doubt that the much-cherished American international law of non-
intervention has undergone a profound metamorphosis since 1959. 
In January 1962, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, condemned 
adherence to communism as incompatible with the inter-American 
system, excluded the Cuban Government from participation in the 
system, and resolved to impose a series of political and economic sanc-
tions against Cuba.72 In October, 1962, in the case of the Cuban 
"quarantine," the OAS acquiesced for the first time in the open use 
of military force against another American republic. And in April, 
1965, the United States on its own authority landed its armed forces 
in the Dominican Republic, ostensibly to preserve the lives of for-
eign nationals,73 but more probably to forestall what it feared would 
be the "establishment of another communist government in the 
Western Hemisphere."74 This re-assertion by the United States of an 
to Latin America, in The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions, 53 DEP'T 
STATE Bou.. 730 (1965). Mr. Theodore Draper has noted that, in the midst of the 
Dominican affair and recurring charges that the United States had abandoned 
adherence to the policy of non-intervention codified since the 1930's in the basic 
instruments of the inter-American system, Secretary Mann "had criticized both 
the OAS and the U.N. Charters for having been drawn up in '19th century terms.'" 
Draper has also observed that it was another high official of the Department of State, 
Mr. W. Averell Harriman, who had told a group in Montevideo (again, in the midst 
of the Dominican intervention) that the doctrine of non-intervention was ,becoming 
"obsolete." Draper, The Dominican Crisis: A Case Study in American Policy, in Com-
mentary, vol. 40, no. 6, Dec. 1965, pp. 33, 66, citing the New York Times, May 7 &: 9, 
1965, and Look, June 15, 1965. 
72. For a survey of the Punta del Este Conference and its implications for the inter-
American system, see Macdonald, The Organization of American States in Action, 15 
U. TORONTO L.J. 359, 382-95 (1964). See also, Fenwick, The Issues at Punta del 
Este: Non-Intervention v. Collective Security, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 469 (1962). 
73. Mann, supra note 71; Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of 
International Law, 53 DEP'T STATE Bou.. 60 (1965). 
74. President Johnson and the Department of State initially maintained that the 
United States' intervention was undertaken to preserve the lives of foreign nationals. 
After the United States' commitment of troops increased, however, officials in Washing-
ton began to speak of a "second stage" in the intervention, in response to what Under 
Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann characterized as "a clear and present danger of 
the forcible seizure of power by the Communists." President Johnson spoke equally 
plainly to a group of visitors :to the White House: "We don't propose to sit here in 
our rocking chairs with our hands folded and let the Communists set up any Govern-
ment in the Western Hemisphere.'' Mr. Leonard C. Meeker, the Legal Adviser of the 
Dominican affair. Although he has said that "we might simply have invoked the 
we did not pursue some particular legal analysis or code, but instead sought a practical 
and satisfactory solution to a pressing problem.'' As the Department's problem became 
ever more pressing, its search for a "practical and satisfactory solution" led it to the 
conclusion that the United States had actually landed its armed forces in the Dominican 
Republic in order to bring an end to a civil war and to maintain minimum public 
order. This third explanation for the United States' unilateral action appears to form 
the basis for Mr. Meeker's non-"fundamentalist" and retrospective analysis of the 
Dominican affair. Although he has said that "we might simply have invoked the 
Monroe Doctrine," Mr. Meeker apparently rejected that rationale, not because the 
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international police power in the New World was not merely subse-
quently endorsed by the OAS, but the "peace-keeping" operation of 
its ostensible surrogate was assumed by the Organization.75 The in-
vocation of the notion of "multilateral intervention" or "collective 
intervention" and the continuing controversy over the latitude 
afforded to regional arrangements under the UN Charter must not 
obscure the simple fact that the territory of an American republic 
was occupied by the armed forces of another, in contravention of the 
fundamental tenet of the inter-American system. These develop-
ments, as well as the formation and operation of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, the progress toward the adoption of 
an inter-American convention on human rights, and the launching 
of an ambitious program for the economic development of Latin 
America, have reflected the growing recognition that the public 
order of the American continent may be threatened as much by in-
ternal forces within the American republics as by intervention from 
without. 
Regardless of one's own views of the propriety or lawfulness of 
Monroe Doctrine as a legal basis for armed intervention in the affairs of American 
states was discarded three decades ago, but rather because it was apparently deemed 
to be too "theoretical" and not altogether consistent with his "practical view" of 
international law. 
For the text of the official statements, over a period of days, justifying the armed 
intervention on different, and occasionally inconsistent grounds, see 'White House 
Press Release, April 28, 1965, in 52 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 738 (1965); Statement by Presi-
dent Johnson, April 30, 1965, in id. at 742; Statement by President Johnson, May 2, 
1965, in id. at 744-48. See also, The Guardian, May 4, 1965; The Times (London), 
May 7, 1965. For Mr. Meeker's views, see The Dominican Situation in the Perspective 
of International Law, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 60 (1965). For Secretary Mann's descrip-
tion of the "two stages" of the Dominican intervention-humanitarian intervention 
followed by the effort to prevent a Communist seizure of power-see The Dominican 
Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 730 (1965). For a well-
documented account of the Dominican affair and the view that "two stages" never 
existed except in the press releases issued by the White House and the Department 
of State, see Draper, supra note 71._ 
In an editorial of May 3, 1965, The Times (London), p. 13, col. 2, noted that 
"President Johnson has taken the deliberate risk of touching Latin American feelings 
on their most sensitive spot by recalling the days when Theodore Roosevelt policed 
the Caribbean with marines .••. " In an editorial of May 3, 1965, The New York Times, 
p. 32, col. I, questioned the factual basis of the United States' decision to intervene "to 
prevent another Cuba," and added: 
The massing of American Marines and paratroopers in ever-increasing num-
bers already has stirred bitter recollections throughout Latin America and the 
world of the excesses of "gunboat diplomacy." A unilateral decision to assign 
these troops an active role in helping the Dominican military junta put down the 
revolt would run counter to all the principles of "progress, democracy and social 
justice," for which Mr. Johnson appealed •••. 
75. For the resolution establishing the Inter-American Peace Force, see Tenth 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS Doc. No. 39 (English), 
reprinted in 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 987 (1965), and 4 INTERNAnONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 594 
(1965). 
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the new interventionism, there is a natural and justifiable inclination 
to applaud the essentially non-political work of the Commission. The 
Commission's success, particularly in the Dominican Republic, may 
do much to encourage the belief that there may yet emerge for the 
American continent a legal regime for the protection of human 
rights similar to the European model. Nevertheless, I would like to 
suggest that Latin American history, the remains of the American 
international law of non-intervention, and the constitutional in-
hibitions of the United States all weigh heavily against such op-
timism. 
There are several fundamental reasons why a legal structure for 
the protection of human rights such as that created in Western 
Europe would prove unworkable in the Americas. In the first place, 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the machinery 
established thereunder reflect the unique post-war situation of 
Western Europe and the renewed commitment of those shattered 
democracies to rebuild their societies on the basis of guarantees for 
fundamental freedoms. As Dr. A. H. Robertson has observed: 
The provisions about human rights in the Statute of the Council of 
Europe, the obligations undertaken in the European Convention 
and the machinery of the Commission and the Court are ... primarily 
to preserve the rule of law and the principles of democracy in the 
member States and, should the danger arise, forestall any trend to 
dictatorship before it is too late.76 
, It is most significant that the human rights program of the Council 
of Europe is primarily designed to preserve existing rights rather 
than to create and enforce new and unknown rights. The program 
rests in large part on the assumption that the states adhering to the 
Convention are generally committed to democratic government and 
basic freedoms. It rests, too, upon a considerable degree of political 
and economic inter-dependence amongst the parties and upon a sub-
stantial number of common interests and common ideals. The states 
adhering to the Convention, and particularly those that have accepted 
the right of individual petition, have relinquished a portion of their 
sovereignty as an expression of their commitment to the principles 
of the Convention and as an indication of their willingness to subject 
their domestic institutions to the scrutiny of a world beyond their 
separate frontiers. They have chosen to permit an international body 
to ad judge the extent to which their political and judicial institutions 
conform to the international standards set by the Convention in the 
76. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN E'Ull.OPE 6 (1963). (Emphasis added.) 
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confidence that their institutions will meet the test and with a readi-
ness to make adjustments in the event that they are found wanting. 
It requires no particular expertise to perceive, from a mere glance 
at the problems confronting the American republics today, that they 
are simply not ready for a system that vests individuals with basic 
rights under international law and provides judicial machinery for 
the vindication of those rights. Dictatorship remains endemic in the 
political life of Latin America, violence continues to be the principal 
vehicle for the attainment of political power in too many states, and, 
as Professor Tannenbaum has noted, "constitutional government has 
remained an unsatisfied aspiration," despite "an almost universal 
commitment to the ideals of democracy among Latin American 
intellectuals and statesmen."77 It would be a mere delusion to believe 
that in states struggling to achieve cultural and national unity78-
little concerned with the interest of their Latin American neighbors 
and very much concerned with the maintenance of their own national 
sovereignty-respect for human rights and democratic principles 
can be effectively inculcated by the erection of a juridical super-
structure reflecting the political values and development of Western 
Europe. If one can fairly say that the European Convention on 
Human Rights embodies the political faith of the people of Western 
Europe, one must also acknowledge that it embodies only the wist-
ful longings of the peoples of Latin America. 
Latin America is, as Arnold Toynbee has observed, "a world in 
itself," one in which the uncritical adoption of alien political forms 
and institutions has had an unhappy history. The primitive state of 
the judicial machinery in many Latin American states, the tenacity 
with which the Latin American republics have continued to adhere 
to the principle of international non-responsibility for denial of 
77. Tannenbaum, The Political Dilemma in Latin America, 38 FOREIGN .AFFAIRS 
497, 499 (1960). 
78. As Philip W. Quigg has cogently written: 
Despite the importance and appearance of hemispheric solidarity, these factors 
do not apply to the countries of Latin America. Their common Hispanic culture 
and certain similarities in the way they look upon life and the world around 
them obscure a vast indifference to one another and a marked desire to be con-
sidered unig_ue •••• [:TJheir knowledge or awareness of other countries of South 
and Central America 1s limited largely to contacts sponsored by public or private 
agencies of the United States. Pan Americanism has not cut deep, and even the 
effort to establish a Common Market has not much strengthened the Latin's sense 
of involvement with one another. Though an incident in Panama or Cuba will 
remind them how closely their destinies are linked, it is easier to find unity in 
what they are against than in what they are for. 
Quigg, Latin America: A Broad-Brush Appraisal, 42 FollEIGN .AFFAIRS 399-400 (1964). A 
similar view is expressed by Professor Ernest R. May in The Alliance for Progress in 
Historical Perspective, 41 FoREIGN AFFAIRS 757,778 (1968). For a thoughtful study of the 
concept of hemispheric solidarity, see WIUTAKER, THE WESIERN HEMISPHERE lJ>EA: 
ITS RISE AND DECLINE (1954). 
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justice to aliens, and the dismal failure of past efforts to establish 
regional adjudicative tribunals79 all militate strongly against the 
79. Despite the assumption of authorities such as Professor Manley 0, Hudson 
that "since their independence began the five Central American states have had a 
tradition of solidarity," an immense amount of good will, and two separate cash gifts 
from Mr. Andrew Carnegie (to build a permanent headquarters), the Central Ameri-
can Court of Justice (1908-1918) failed to play a significant role in the life of the 
area. Its most sympathetic student, Professor Hudson, was compelled to conclude that 
the Court did not exercise "any great influence during its short lease of life." Hudson, 
The Central American Court of Justice, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 785 (1932). Yet such 
was the faith of Professor Hudson in international judicial machinery that he at-
tributed the failure of the Court to incidental factors such as the justices' lack of 
judicial independence; their relatively short terms of office; the manner of paying 
their salaries (by each justice's own government); and the national oaths required 
of each member of the Court. These factors, of course, merely reflected the underlying 
fragmentation of Central American society, which doomed the Central American 
Court of Justice from the outset. 
The proposal of Dr. James Brown Scott and others, see note 14 supra, in the 
1920's and 1930's for an Inter-American Tribunal of International Justice did not 
arouse much interest in the United States. See INTER-AMERICAN TRIBUNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL JUSTICE: MEMORANDUM PROJECT AND DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANIED BY OBSERVA• 
TIONS (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 
Pamphlet No. 56, 1937). This lack of interest was doubtless caused by the fear that 
the United States would be placed at a severe disadvantage before such a tribunal, 
Professor Bemis, one of the skeptics, undoubtedly expressed a widely-held view when 
he wrote: 
[U]nlike the Permanent Court of International Justice that had had been set up 
m Europe as an organ of the League of Nations, the judges of the proposed 
American court would have been ovenvhelmingly representative of Latin American 
jurisprudence by the proportion of ten to one. Whether such a court were a safe 
refuge for justice for the United States was debatable. 
BEMIS, THE LATIN AMERICAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 245 (1943). 
More recent suggestions by Latin American states for the establishment of regional 
international tribunals have proved equally fruitless. There is reason to believe that 
the views expressed by Professor Bemis in the early 1940's would be widely shared 
by United States policy-makers today. At the Tenth Inter-American Conference, held 
in Caracas in 1954, a resolution was adopted asking the Council of the OAS to as-
certain the views of members with regard to the establishment of an Inter-American 
Court of Justice and, in the event that a majority of states favored such a proposal, 
to order the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Inter-American Council 
. of Jurists to prepare a draft statute for such a court. Final Act, Resolution C, in 
48 AM. J. INT'L L. 123, 131 (Supp. 1954). The proposal appears to have been relegated 
to the limbo of OAS resolutions on juridical matters. 
There have been some faint signs of a renewed interest in the creation of a Central 
American Court of Justice. See, e.g., Palma Martinez, La Corte de ]usticia Centor-
americana, in ORGANIZACI6N DE EsrADOS CENTROAMERICANOS (ODECA), BoLETfN JURIDICO 
y LEGISLATIVO 57 (Guatemala 1957). At the Sixth Extraordinary Meeting of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of Central America, held in Panama in December 1962, a new 
charter for the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) was adopted. This 
Charter provides for the establishment of a new Central American Court of Justice, 
apparently along somewhat less ambitious lines than its ill-fated predecessor. Ac-
cording to one report, the Court is to serve as "an organ of consultation in judicial 
matters" and as the Court of Arbitration envisioned in the Central American Treaty 
of Economic Integration. Engel, The New Charter of the Organization of Central 
American States, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 127, 129-31 (1964). For the text of the new Charter, 
see INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE INTER-AMERICAN 
SYSTEM: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING 480 (1966). The precise purposes, struc-
ture, terms of reference, and rules of procedure of the projected tribunal have ap-
parently remained somewhat obscure. Even the composition of the court seems to 
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start in the Americas of a human rights program which is based upon 
the European Convention on Human Rights and which provides 
machinery to adjudicate claims of non-compliance. Moreover, it 
would appear somewhat fantastic to expect the very nations that have 
most strenuously resisted and challenged the principle of inter-
national responsibility for the treatrµ.ent of aliens to undertake posi-
tive international obligations with respect to the treatment of their 
own nationals. 
There is yet another reason why we must regard with consider-
able skepticism efforts to encourage the inter-American system to 
adopt the basic structure of the human rights program of the Council 
of Europe, or perhaps any convention on human rights. Without the 
support and adherence of the United States there can be no reason-
able expectation that a human rights convention operating within 
the framework of the inter-American system will ever be widely 
ratified. The Latin Americans would doubtless feel that it was an 
unflattering and paternalistic assessment of their national institu-
tions to be asked to surrender a substantial degree of their national 
sovereignty while the United States remains unwilling to do likewise. 
And there is little doubt that the same constitutional considerations 
that to date have prevented United States ratification of other con-
ventions in the human rights field will continue to compel it to 
refrain from adhering to an American version of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.80 It would be wise to consider the 
possibility that a convention which does not work and which is not 
widely ratified may do more harm to the cause of international 
protection of human rights than would no convention at all. 
Thus, for the effective protection of human rights in the Amer-
be open to some doubt. Thus, Mr. Engel is able to report only that the provision of 
article 14 of the new ODECA Charter, providing for a tribunal composed of the 
"presidents of the Judicial Powers" of the member states "probably means the presi-
dents of the respective Supreme Courts." Engel, supra at 129. (Emphasis added.) On 
March 30, 1965, the new Charter of ODECA came into force. See Engel, The New 
ODECA, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 806 (1966). 
80. From the very outset, the United States announced that it would be unable 
to adhere to an American human rights convention or to accept the jurisdiction of 
a regional court of human rights. Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Final Act 18-19 (1959); :Ball, Issue for the Americas: Non-Inter-
vention v. Human Rights and the Preservation of Democratic Institutions, 15 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 21, 26 (1961). For a comprehensive examination of the 
constitutional probleins involved, from the perspective of North American municipal 
law and of international law, and a resounding dissent from what appears to remain 
the prevailing view, see McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World 
Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. 
PROB, 490 (1949), reprinted in 59 YALE L.J. 60 (1949), and in McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN 
WoRLD Punuc ORDER 335 (1960). 
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ican continent, within obvious limitations, it may be preferable to 
rely upon the non-judicial, and essentially non-political, efforts of an 
agency like the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The 
Commission can concern itself with the more flagrant violations of 
human rights, can use the exposure techniques at its disposal to 
seek corrective action within the framework of municipal law, and 
can play some role in safeguarding fundamental freedoms during 
periods of strife in the internal order of states. The only other effec-
tive alternative in contemporary Latin America would seem to be a 
regional program of coercion based upon the notion that the consti-
tuent instruments of the inter-American system permit, or should 
permit, "collective intervention" in any case deemed to affect the 
peace of the Americas. Such a program for the protection of human 
rights might well appeal to those who agree with Professor Richard 
Falk that "there is a basic difference between regional coercion that 
contradicts and that which fulfills universal conceptions of minimum 
conditions for an acceptable form of domestic order.''81 However, it 
would appear to be a less than satisfactory solution to those who do 
not have complete faith in their ability to perceive these "universal 
conceptions," or who would be reluctant to allow a regional arrange-
ment the freedom to act upon its own formulation of these "universal 
conceptions" without the authorization of the global institution 
created for the maintenance of international peace and security-the 
United Nations. 
One student of the inter-American system, in noting the United 
States' inevitable objections to an international instrument like the 
European Convention, has suggested as an alternative a treaty that 
would elaborate "a more definite statement" of the principles of 
democratic government and human rights and that would establish 
a commission with broad powers to investigate alleged violations of 
human rights. In 1962, he wrote: 
Such a treaty would confirm the principles to which the OAS ad-
heres, but would not attempt to set up an international system to 
review and pass upon the judicial processes of individual govern-
ments-a step for which the American republics are still not pre-
pared.82 
A human rights program such as the one outlined above does not, 
of course, require a treaty. A commission of the kind suggested is 
81. Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in INTER-
NATIONAL Asl'ECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 185, 243 (Rosenau ed. 1964). 
82. DREIER, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE HEMISl'HERE CRISE.S 
134 (1962). 
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already in existence, and its work program is in fact designed to 
provide "a more definite statement" of the principles of democracy 
and human rights. Its recent history indicates that an agency dedi-
cated to impartial fact-gathering and to the exposure of the more 
flagrant violations of fundamental liberties might well be the most 
prudent and workable alternative to a carte blanche grant of author-
ity to the political organs of the OAS or to the creation of administra-
tive and judicial machinery unsuited to the political realities of 
modern Latin America. However, the extent to which political real-
ities will permit even the present Commission to operate even-
handedly is not free of doubt. Although the Commission has reported 
the receipt of petitions from within the United States, it has shown 
no inclination to undertake an inquiry into alleged violations of civil 
rights in the United States. In view of the rebuff that it might receive 
if it sought to do so, and of the ensuing detrimental effect upon the 
Commission's future usefulness, this reluctance is well considered. 
But it raises the fundamental question of the extent to which an 
international body of this kind, avowedly concerned with the promo-
tion and protection of human rights in all of the American republics, 
can indulge the United States' traditional reluctance to accept any 
international responsibility for alleged deprivations of the rights of 
its nationals. If the United States' constitutional and political inhibi-
tions are indeed to be indulged, in the interest of the Commission's 
effective operation in less-well-endowed parts of the Western Hemi-
sphere, the Commission will ultimately be required to acknowledge 
that it exists only to oversee the conduct of the OAS' Hispanic-
American members. Alternatively, if there is to be any pretense at 
an even-handed administration of its mandate, the Commission may 
feel obliged to confine its intervention to situations in which the 
national system of government and law enforcement has completely 
broken down. 
The next year or two will be especially important in determining 
the future usefulness of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. If it can remain scrupulously free of the political decision-
making and goals of the OAS and if it can retain its reputation for 
impartiality, we may expect the Commission to continue to exercise 
an important, and possibly expanded,83 role in the years ahead. If so, 
83. At its thirteenth session, in April 1966, the Commission took a far-reaching 
step in the direction of expanding its role and functions. In pursuance of the request 
made in Resolution XXII of the Second Special Inter-American Conference (Rio de 
Janeiro, November 1965), that it "conduct a continuing survey of the observance of 
fundamental human rights in each of the member states of the Organization," and 
under the authority of article 9 d. of its enabling act (empowering it "to urge the Gov-
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the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights may well have 
paved a middle road toward the international protection of the 
fundamental human rights of the peoples of the New World. 
ernments of the member states to supply it with information on the measures adopted 
by them in matters of human rights'), the Commission resolved to request annual 
reports from each member state of the OAS on the measures adopted by each to ad• 
just their municipal law to the principles enunciated in the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
These annual reports are also to provide information on "any suspension of guarantees 
and the reasons therefor." Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on 
the Work Accomplished During Its Thirteenth Session, April 18 to 28, 1966, OEA/ 
Ser. L/V /II.74, Doc. 35 (English) (Sept. 30, 1966), pp. 38-39. 
